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ABSTRACT
Theoretical and empirical work suggesting associations between (1) mindfulness and
depression and (2) cognitive biases (CBs) and depression lay the groundwork for novel questions
about how to model mindfulness, how mindfulness and CBs are linked, how CBs are associated
with one another, and how CBs may explain the association between mindfulness and
depression. The present study derived a model of mindfulness, from which a structural model
was built to explore relationships among factors in the model, including attention bias (AB),
interpretation bias (IB), and depressive symptoms in a sample of emerging adults. Findings
suggested a bi-factor Exploratory Structural Equation Model best fit the data. Results showed
mindful non-judgment (but not attention) was related to depression through IB, but not through
AB. AB was not related to depression or IB in any model. Implications for the construct of
mindfulness and the role of cognitive biases in the mindfulness-depression link are considered.
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1
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Mindfulness – A call for research
The practice of mindfulness is rooted in religious traditions thousands of years old.
Buddhism, specifically, proliferated the intentional practice of being mindful as a way to calm
and control the mind (Kabat-Zinn, 2003). Recent empirical interest in mindfulness as it relates to
well-being is evident in the surge of publications in the past 25 years, climbing from around
2000 instances in 1990 to 32,000 in 2015 (Van Dam et al., 2017). Despite the abundance of
research on mindfulness, several problems have plagued the topic of study. For example, there
has been a lack of consensus on mindfulness as a construct, along with questionably rigorous
methodology. In addition, the field has perhaps rushed to apply knowledge to intervention
programs before the science is sound. As a result, many mindfulness-based interventions exist in
the absence of strong evidence to support their effectiveness. In response to these critiques of the
literature, there has been a call for research to focus on the multi-dimensional “mental states,
processes, and functions” (Van Dam et al., 2017, p. 41) that comprise the construct.
1.2 Defining mindfulness
One of the most oft-quoted definitions of mindfulness comes from Kabat-Zinn (2003); he
defines mindfulness as “the awareness that emerges through paying attention on purpose, in the
present moment, and nonjudgmentally to the unfolding of experience moment by moment” (p.
145). Despite this widely accepted theoretical conceptualization, researchers have used
mindfulness as an umbrella term to encompass a range of concepts and practices. For instance,
the mindfulness literature includes research on mindfulness as a trait, as a state, and as an active
ingredient in interventions that incorporate a variety of meditation and mindfulness-informed
practices (e.g. meditation, yoga, tai chi, etc.). The lack of a consensus definition is reflected in
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the myriad measurement tools utilized, variable factor structures identified, and range of methods
for operationalizing the construct (Van Dam et al., 2017). As of 2016, the research canon
included 11 different self-report questionnaires measuring mindfulness, 9 of which were
reviewed by Van Dam et al. (2017). While theoretical discourse often uses the term
“mindfulness” to reference a cohesive construct consisting of attention and acceptance, there is
inconsistency in the factor structure of mindfulness across questionnaires. Only three of the nine
included in Van Dam et al.’s review found support for a two-factor structure (PHLMS, TMS,
SMS), one of which reflected the two separate factors of attention and acceptance (PHLMS). To
add to the confusion, there was great variability in whether mindfulness was modeled as a latent,
overarching factor. In sum, although mindfulness is often talked about in a similar way (attention
to the present moment without judgement), there is no consensus in the research canon about
how to model or measure it.
To address some of the questions about the construct of mindfulness, Coffey et al. (2010)
built on previous work by Baer et al. (2006) to derive a measure of mindfulness empirically. This
work specifically examined dispositional mindfulness, which has been shown to exist in varying
amounts in all people (Gilbert & Christopher, 2010). Baer et al. developed the Five Factor
Mindfulness Questionnaire (FFMQ) to test and confirm the factor structure of mindfulness by
conducting a series of factor analyses that included items from multiple mindfulness measures.
Coffey and colleagues built upon Baer’s work and used a series of exploratory, confirmatory,
and path analyses to create “a revised model for mindfulness’ mechanisms of action that
accounts for the multi-faceted nature of the construct” (p. 238). Their empirically-derived model
includes two main factors – attention and acceptance – but not an overarching latent mindfulness
construct. Attention can be understood as present moment focus on emotions, physical
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sensations, and experience of the external environment. Non-judgmental acceptance is defined as
the opposite of judgmental, self-critical, non-acceptance of internal experiences that are
unpleasant. Coffey et al.’s findings support the conceptualization of attention and acceptance as
multi-dimensional indicators of mindfulness and point to the importance of testing specific
effects of these factors as separate dimensions in future models.
These findings are in line with Bishop et al.’s (2004) theory, which proposes that
mindfulness includes multiple multi-dimensional processes, namely attention and acceptance.
However, while Coffey and colleagues (2010) identified mindfulness as collectively consisting
of these two factors, they relied on subscales from existing measures to indicate them, rather than
deriving their own subscales using all available items. In other words, the attention factor was
indicated by the pre-identified attention subscale, and the two subscales of acceptance and nonjudgement were used to indicate a non-judgmental acceptance factor. Further, they did not test an
overarching (latent) mindfulness factor. In fact, they found that the attention and non-judgmental
acceptance factors were uncorrelated. They did, however, suggest an overarching factor visually
by grouping the attention and acceptance factors together in a single box labeled “mindfulness”
(p. 243). The current study draws from the foundational work of Coffey et al. (2010) and takes a
different approach to explore the factor structure of mindfulness. Namely, we utilized all items
from the potential scales to explore the factor structure of mindfulness. In doing so, we assessed
their conceptualization of mindfulness as consisting of two multi-dimensional “attention” and
“non-judgmental acceptance” factors while also exploring the possible existence of a higher
order mindfulness factor.
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1.3 Mindfulness and depression
Dispositional mindfulness has been associated with a range of positive outcomes,
including global mental health, and has also been negatively associated with psychopathology.
Specifically, trait mindfulness has been found to negatively relate to depression (Jimenez, Niles,
& Park, 2010; Way, Creswell, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2010), a chronic, episodic condition
involving negative mood as well as physical and cognitive symptoms associated with severe
impairment (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). A meta-analysis examining mindfulness
training on depression revealed large effect sizes (Hofmann, Sawyer, Witt, & Oh, 2010), and
mindfulness interventions have demonstrated reduced risk for relapse of major depressive
disorder through randomized control trials (Creswell, 2015). As Coffey et al. (2010) point out,
these important findings frame the study of dispositional mindfulness as worthwhile, in that it
will advance understanding about both the construct of mindfulness and the mechanisms by
which it is associated with mental health broadly, and depression, specifically.
Studies designed to delineate the mechanisms involved in the association between
mindfulness and depression have identified (1) the generation of positive emotions, (2) belief in
one’s ability to regulate emotions and repair mood, (3) self-acceptance, and (4) rumination, as
some of the significant mediators of the relationship (Jimenez et al., 2010; Petrocchi & Ottaviani,
2016). Other studies have shown that dispositional mindfulness is related to the ability to
regulate negative affect via mediating variables such as clarity about internal experience and
being able to see that happiness does not depend on the external world (Coffey et al., 2010).
However, research exploring the role of cognitive biases, like attention and interpretation biases,
in the relationship between mindfulness and mental health is lacking. This is significant in light
of the robust association between cognitive biases, which can be defined broadly as mental
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mistakes or systematic errors in cognition (Beck, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973), and
depression. The current study begins to fill this gap in the literaure by investigating the relations
among mindfulness, cognitive biases (i.e., attention and interpretation biases), and depression.
This approach may also add value to the mindfulness research canon by identifying cognitive
processes associated with mindfulness that do not rely on the self-report format of the
mindfulness assessments typically employed (Quickel, Johnson, & David, 2014).
1.4 Depression in emerging adulthood
As the second most prevalent mental illness, depression is a serious public health
concern. Depression ranks as the 19th most common disease worldwide, and it is estimated that
16% of people will experience an episode of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) in their lifetime
(Kessler et al., 2005). In addition to being prevalent, MDD has a negative impact on individual
suffering and mortality, families, and society. In fact, individuals with depression are 20-27%
more likely to commit suicide and twice as likely to die prematurely from all causes compared to
their healthy counterparts (Lépine, 2011). Furthermore, depression is second only to back pain as
the leading cause of disability worldwide (Kessler et al., 2015) and is predicted by the World
Health Organization to be the leading cause of disease burden by 2030 (Lépine, 2011). In
addition to increases in suffering and mortality, the functional and social impairments resulting
from depression impact job stability and overall income. Alarmingly, work absence or impaired
performance resulting from depression is estimated to cost the US $36.6 billion dollars every
year.
The impact of depression is arguably even larger during emerging adulthood (EA), a key
period of development from around ages 18 to 30 (Arnett, Žukauskiene, & Sugimura, 2014),
during which depression often emerges (De Girolamo, Dagani, Purcell, Cocchi, & McGorry,
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2012). Specifically, the prevalence of depression is estimated at 30.6% in university students
(Ibrahim, Kelly, Adams, & Glazebrook, 2013), almost twice that of the general population.
Further, the number of undergraduate and graduate students reporting depressive symptoms
severe enough to impair functioning is on the rise, from 14.8% in 2008 to 18.8% in 2018
(American College Health Association, 2009, 2018). Given the recurrent and chronic nature of
depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), its potential to impact emerging adults (EAs) is
especially significant, as depression during this important developmental period can lead to a
life-long cascade of negative events interfering with social relationships, academic and career
success, and emotional and physical health (Bruffaerts et al., 2018; Ibrahim et al., 2013). For
example, depression has been found to negatively predict exam performance in university
students (Wilding, Andrews, & Wilding, 2016), and students with mood disorders have been
found 2.9 times more likely to fail out of college compared to students without a mood disorder
(Kessler, Foster, Saunders, & Stang, 1995). As is clear from these recent statistics, this
developmental period of EA, characterized by identity exploration, self-focus, instability, and
“in-between-ness” (Arnett et al., 2014), deserves focused attention with respect to mental health,
broadly, and depression, specifically.
The high rate and cost of depression in EAs suggest that efforts aimed at better
understanding factors that influence vulnerability, such as cognitive biases, are imperative.
Doing so at this point of developmental transition where depression can impact trajectories
makes this endeavor especially worthy of pursuit. Equally important is research that uncovers
factors associated with lower depression risk, or depression resilience factors. Beginning in the
1960’s, researchers began exploring resilience, and the field saw such studies proliferate during
the 70’s and 80’s, followed by subsequent waves of resilience research that have led to a shift
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away from frameworks based solely on risk factors towards those based on strengths (Masten &
Monn, 2015). This transformation in theory, research, and practice demonstrates the value of
such exploration and speaks to the need for continuing research on resilience.
In line with this call to uncover factors that confer vulnerability to depression as well as
factors that may act to protect or inoculate individuals from experiencing the symptoms, the
present study (1) explores mindfulness, one potential depression resilience factor that has
received much attention in the literature, (2) as it relates to cognitive bias, a well-documented
vulnerability factor, (3) in a model predicting depressive symptoms in EAs. In the following
sections, theoretical and empirical work suggesting the associations between (1) mindfulness and
depression and (2) cognitive biases and depression lay the groundwork for novel questions: what
is the empirical structure of mindfulness? how are mindfulness and cognitive biases linked? how
are cognitive biases associated with one another? and how might cognitive biases explain the
association between mindfulness and depression? The current study explores the possibility of an
overarching mindfulness factor that consists of sub-factors and proposes that these sub-factors
differentially relate to cognitive biases and depression. Further, the cognitive biases of attention
and interpretation are proposed to indirectly affect the relationship between mindfulness and
depression in EAs. While robust findings support the connections between mindfulness and
depression, and separately, attention and interpretation biases and depression, there is limited
research on the relationship between mindfulness and attention and interpretation biases, and
support is even more scarce when considering how this relationship may be associated with
depression.
1.4 Cognitive biases in depression
1.4.1 History and theory of cognitive biases in depression
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Over the past several decades, researchers exploring the etiology of depression have
focused on the role of cognition, proposing that a key contributing factor to depression
development, maintenance, and relapse is the biased processing of emotional information that
results in sustained negative attention and emotion dysregulation (Hilland et al., 2018). Cognitive
theories of depression have a long history, and two of the most common cognitive mechanisms
found to be atypical in people with depression are biases in the types of information that is
attended to (attention biases) and how that information is interpreted (interpretation biases).
Cognitive models of depression purport that the onset and maintenance of depressive
symptoms are causally connected to distorted thoughts and biased information processing. Such
models operate within a diathesis-stress framework, wherein depression results from negative
affective states that stem from the activation of maladaptive underlying schemas, which are
triggered by stressful life events or negative moods (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007b). Such
an approach prioritizes the role of information processing in maladaptive emotional responses,
and has grown largely from Beck’s Cognitive Schema Theory (Beck, 1967), along with Bower’s
Associative Network Theory (1981; De Raedt & Koster, 2010), and the more recent dual-process
models proposed by Sheppard and Teasdale (2000) and Beevers (2005; Beck, 2008). All in all,
cognitive theories of depression emphasize the role of biased attention, interpretation, and
memory. This section will briefly explore cognitive models of depression vulnerability in order
to expose the reasons that mindfulness and cognitive biases may be associated.
1.4.1.1 Beck’s cognitive model for depression. Incorporating previous theories of
depression vulnerability, Beck (2008) described an expanded, comprehensive cognitive model
for depression. According to Beck’s re-formulation, cognitive vulnerability to depression
originates with early negative life events that contribute to the development of dysfunctional
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attitudes, which are organized in negative cognitive schemas reflecting themes of worthlessness,
loss, and failure (Beck, 2008; Beevers, 2005). These maladaptive schemas, when triggered by
activating events or moods, are thought to bias how information is attended to, interpreted, and
remembered (Beck, 2008; De Raedt & Koster, 2010). Influenced by Bower’s (1981) Associative
Network Model of Learning and Memory, Beck describes how the negative schemas become
further organized into a “depressive mode” once they have been activated time and again. This
depressive mode also includes schemas around behavior and motivation, in addition to mood. If
a negative event is powerful enough (or enough small negative events accumulate), this
depressive mode takes over information processing, making it happen automatically and reflect
negative attentional and interpretation biases, while any cognitive control that could correct these
biases is suppressed. Depression ensues, the symptoms of which are then similarly evaluated
through a negative lens, thereby fueling a negative feedback loop (Beck, 2008).
1.4.1.2 Dual-process models. While the initial activation of information processing
networks is thought to contribute to depression vulnerability and severity, the way an individual
responds to initial activation is also thought to be important and sheds light on depression in the
context of dual processes. Dual process models originated in the fields of social and personality
psychology, where they were used to describe cognition according to two distinct but interrelated
modes by which humans process information. Fast, automatic processing that relies on solidified
network associations, as described above, is the work of the associative mode. The reflective
mode on the other hand, is slow and requires deliberate effort, intentionally activated in the face
of violated expectancies (Beevers, 2005). Only recently have dual process models been more
widely extended to clinical frameworks (Beck, 2008). Sheppard and Teasdale (2000), for
instance, postulated that maladaptive thoughts in depression stemmed both from heightened
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access to negative schemas, which would fit within the associative processing mode, and from a
decreased awareness of the resulting thoughts and feelings, which can be understood as a failure
of the reflective mode, or what they referred to as metacognitive monitoring (De Raedt & Koster,
2010). A similar two-process framework of depression was more recently put forth by Beevers
(2005), who proposed that the failure of reflective processing to correct negatively biased
associative information processing is specifically what contributes to depression vulnerability
(Beck, 2008). Cognitive vulnerability to depression, therefore, stems from associative processing
of attention, interpretation, and memory that biases self-referential processing negatively.
Reflective processing has the potential ability to correct this negative processing by intentionally
shifting attention to unrelated positive networks, but left uncorrected, negatively biased selfreferent processing can cascade into depression (Beevers, 2005).
1.4.2 Research support for cognitive biases in depression
Several decades of research have instantiated various aspects of biased information
processing theorized across these cognitive models of depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010).
Initial studies provided evidence that the content of thoughts differed between people with and
without depression (Gotlib & Joorman, 2010). Specifically, research has revealed stronger ties to
self-referential and general information processing of a negative valence in depressed people.
The strength of this bias corresponds to depression chronicity and persists despite symptom
remission (Beevers, 2005; Mathews and McCloud, 2005). More recently, research has tested
Beck’s proposal that maladaptive automatic information processes implicated in depression
would reveal themselves through cognitive biases seen in attention, memory, and interpretation
(Gotlib et al., 2004). Research has demonstrated that, indeed, biases towards attending to
negative content, negative automatic thoughts, a tendency to remember negative events more
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than positive ones, and a trend towards interpreting neutral events negatively are all implicated in
the onset and maintenance of depression (Fritzsche et al., 2010; Gotlib & Joorman, 2010;
Mathews & MacLeod 2005). Further, these biases have also been found in children who have a
mother with depression, before any of their own symptoms emerge (Joormann et al., 2007b),
suggesting they may play a causal role in depression etiology.
1.4.2.1 Research support for attention biases in depression. When specifically
considering the role of attention biases in depresion, a recent meta-analysis confirms that people
with depressive symptoms demonstrate skewed attention favoring negative content (Everaert,
Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). Other research has demonstrated that negatively biased attention in
depressed individuals results from increased difficulty inhibiting attention toward negative
information (Everaert et al., 2012). Thus, some research suggests that people with depression
preferentially focus their attention on negative stimuli, while other research shows that depressed
individuals may not initially attend to negative information more often than controls, but do have
difficulty disengaging from it once their attention is captured (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In eye
tracking studies, for example, depressed participants didn’t detect negative information more
readily than non-depressed controls, but they did look at pictures depicting negative emotions
(loss, sadness) significantly longer (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). In addition to attention biases
resulting from difficulty disengaging from negative information, depressed individuals have also
been found to avoid positive content (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010), which is in opposition
to healthy controls, who not only demonstrate a lack of negatively biased attention but actually
exhibit attention biases towards positive information (Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007a).
1.4.2.2. Research support for interpretation biases in depression. Along with biases in
attention, the literature supports Beck’s hypothesis that depressed individuals demonstrate biases
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in how they interpret stimuli. While some discrepancies exist, findings largely hold that people
with depression tend to interpret ambiguous situations negatively, compared to non-depressed
controls (Bisson & Sears, 2007). For instance, participants with clinically elevated depressive
symptoms have been found to favor negatively-biased reactions to hypothetical situations, and
dysphoric participants have shown more agreement with negative self-relevant feedback than
controls (Wisco, 2009).
Although promising, findings such as these have been criticized for relying solely on selfreport methods, with critics noting that negative response choices may reflect a response bias and
not an interpretation bias per say. In other words, it is possible that depressed participants may
differ from non-depressed participants according to the responses they report, with depressed
participants reporting more negative interpretations, which may or may not accurately reflect
initial processing (Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006). However, negative interpretation biases
have also been identified in depressed individuals using experimental methods designed to
address this shortcoming. For example, the scrambled sentences task (SST) was developed to test
the hypothesis that depressed individuals are more inclined to demonstrate a negative automatic
interpretation bias under cognitive load (Hindash & Amir, 2012). In this task, 20 sentences with
scrambled words are presented, and the participant must arrange the words in order to create a
grammatically correct sentence. Negative and neutral sentences are both possible outcomes, and
negative bias is determined by the number of negative sentences constructed during the allotted
time (Hindash & Amir, 2012). Research employing the SST has identified negative interpretation
biases in currently and formerly depressed individuals (Hindash & Amir, 2012) and shown them
to predict future depressive symptoms. Dearing and Gotlib (2009) used a similar task consistent
of self-relevant ambiguous scenarios and found a negative interpretation bias in never-depressed
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high-risk daughters of mothers with depression, supporting the causal role that negative
interpretation may play in depression (Hindash & Amir, 2012). Using another experimental
paradigm employing images of faces that morphed from ambiguous to either happy or sad
expressions, Beevers et al. (2009) found that dysphoric participants were more inclined to
interpret mixed happy-sad emotions as sad compared to non-dysphoric controls. Taken together,
it is clear that negative interpretation biases are evident in depression, though additional research
using robust experimental paradigms is needed.
1.4.2.3 The combined cognitive bias hypothesis. Although attention and interpretation
biases have both been identified independently in currently depressed and at-risk participants,
only recently have scientists begun to theorize and test how these biases are related to each other.
The Combined Cognitive Bias (CCB) Hypothesis (Hirsch, Clark, & Mathews, 2006) proposes
that cognitive biases interact and reciprocally influence each other, and that collective biases
impact depression more than any individual isolated bias. Specifically, the CCB Hypothesis
posits that the challenge of disengaging from negative stimuli, exhibited as negative attention
bias in depression, informs how those stimuli are interpreted, and in turn, remembered. Empirical
tests of the CCB hypothesis demonstrate that in sub-clinical samples, negative attention biases
are associated with higher negative interpretation biases and, in turn, more negatively biased
memory (Sanchez, Duque, Romero, & Vazquez, 2017). Furthermore, Everaert, Tierens, Uzieblo,
and Koster (2013) have shown that attention bias influences memory bias indirectly through
interpretation bias. Interestingly, in this study, interpretation and memory biases related to
depression, but attention biases did not, suggesting that even when some cognitive mechanisms
are not directly related to depression, they can impact other levels of processing that are.
However, a more recent study found all three biases related to depression severity, as well as to
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each other (Sanchez et al., 2017). This same study advanced the understanding of CCB models
by comparing two potential models of attention, interpretation, and memory biases as they relate
to depression. Findings suggest that negative interpretation bias plays a key role in depression
severity, and the model in which negative attention bias predicted interpretation bias was the
most robust (Sanchez et al., 2017). While such findings advance an understanding of the
relationships among cognitive biases and depression, additional research is needed to (1) clarify
discrepancies about the relationship between cognitive biases and depression, and (2) further
explore whether attention bias precedes interpretation bias (as was suggested by Sanchez et al.,
2017), vice versa, or whether they occur simultaneously or through other information processes.
Regardless of nuances in the mechanisms, it is clear that biases in both attention and
interpretation are in some way associated with the etiology and maintenance of depression. The
study at hand offers additional clarification on the nuances of these relationships.
1.5 Mindfulness, cognitive biases, and depression
While research demonstrates that cognitive biases and mindfulness both relate to
depression, there are different potential models that may explain associations (1) between
mindfulness and cognitive biases, and (2) among mindfulness, cognitive biases, and depression.
Despite clear theoretical ties between mindfulness and cognition, there is a dearth of empirical
work examining the cognitive underpinnings of mindfulness, especially relative to studies of
cognitive biases and depression that have accumulated over several decades. Furthermore, how
these variables interact with each other in relation to depression is almost entirely unexplored.
1.5.1 Mindfulness and cognitive biases
As mentioned above, mindfulness, as operationalized by Bishop et al. (2004), is grounded
in self-regulating attention and awareness of experience through an accepting and open lens,
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which are both mechanisms of cognition (De Raedt et al., 2012). This conceptualization is
consistent with Mayer et al.’s (2018) discussion of mindfulness using the term “Beginner’s
Mind,” referencing the capacity to perceive each experience as novel, without biases. Some
evidence supporting the relationship between mindfulness and cognitive biases comes from
examining cross-sectional relations, while other evidence comes from testing changes in
information processing among individuals who have engaged in mindfulness training. For
example, mindfulness interventions, such as Mindfulness Based Stress Reduction (MBSR), have
demonstrated reductions in negative cognitions and dysfunctional attitudes for intervention
participants relative to controls (De Raedt et al., 2012; Desrosiers, Vine, Klemanski, & NolenHoeksema, 2013). Relatedly, an inverse association between mindfulness and negative
cognitions has been documented, along with a positive association between mindfulness and
openness to positive information (De Raedt et al., 2012).
1.5.2 Mindfulness, cognitive biases, and depression
We have some evidence, cited above, that mindfulness and general cognitive biases are
associated. We now turn to more theoretical perspectives that make the case that the facets of
mindfulness (present-moment attention and non-judgmental acceptance) are almost, by
definition, interwoven with the cognitive processes of interest (attention and interpretation), and
thus, may impact depression via these cognitive biases.
1.5.2.3 Present-moment attention and depression. Present-moment attention, in the
context of mindfulness, is defined as attending to external and internal stimuli as they rise and
fade away. This means focusing attention on present internal and external sensory experiences
(i.e., thoughts, emotions, physical sensations), and learning to retrain one’s attention to stay
focused rather than allowing the mind to wander or fixate (De Raedt et al., 2012). Studies have in

16
fact shown that present-moment attention is related to fewer thoughts about the past and future
(Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007; Xu, Purdon, Seli, & Smilek, 2017); as such, mindfulness may
be inversely associated with depression via reduced reliance on biased self-schemas and selfconcepts that are built on historical influences (Gilbert & Christopher, 2010). Such attention
further allows one to be present to and notice the experience of all sensations and emotions
(positive, negative, and neutral) as they arise and fade away. It is plausible then, that greater
levels of mindfulness may relate to lower levels of depression through less biased attention.
1.5.2.4 Present-moment attention, non-judgmental acceptance, and depression.
Some theory suggests that for present moment attention to be beneficial, it must be paired with
non-judgmental acceptance, which inhibits attachment to stimuli brought into the field of
awareness, allowing them to pass, and creating space for other stimuli to enter. In fact, present
moment attention may actually be harmful for people who are not able to respond nonjudgmentally (Desrosiers et al., 2014). Consider, then, that it is not just noticing internal and
external stimuli that makes a difference, but the non-reactive stance that emerges in response to
that noticing (Coffey et al., 2010). As Desrosiers et al. (2014) explain, “it matters not only
whether individuals tend to observe their experiences, but also the way in which they observe”
(p. 32). Consider that the acceptance of emotions and stimuli brought into awareness may lead
people to be more acutely aware of shifting affective indicators, including errors and affective
responses to errors, better equipping them to respond with action (Teper, Segal, & Inzlicht,
2013). A wider awareness of initial sensory information reveals a greater range of possible
interpretations of the given situation, but it is the non-judgmental awareness factor that produces
un-biased interpretations. In this way, mindfulness may serve as a mechanism for reflective
processing or cognitive control that corrects automatic processing biases, according to Beck
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(2008) and Beevers’ (2005) dual-process cognitive model of depression. Evidence supporting
this demonstrates how it is only for people who are highly reactive (signaling low nonjudgmental awareness) that observing is associated with depressive symptoms (Desrosiers et al.,
2014).
1.5.2.5 How attention and non-judgmental awareness interrupt cognitive biases. The
essential nature of the non-judgmental awareness dimension of mindfulness in the interplay
between cognition and depression is supported by a study that found higher trait mindfulness to
be associated with making fewer cognitive errors, above and beyond what attention accounted
for (Herndon, 2008). This signifies cognitive errors as important to consider when trying to
understanding how mindfulness may be related to depression, and further indicates the
importance of non-judgmental awareness, which facilitates an open-minded and curious
approach to experiences, regardless of whether or not they are unpleasant (Cameron &
Fredrickson, 2015). In this way, mindful attention and non-judgmental awareness expand the
landscape of information to be processed, which allows all information equal “weight” for
interpretation, thus reducing cognitive biases. Gilbert and Christopher (2010), indeed, discovered
that a significant relationship between negative cognitions and depression was only present in
individuals low in mindfulness. Further support comes from research showing that attention
significantly predicts depression via an increase in the cognitive bias of rumination, but only for
highly-reactive people (those low in non-judgmental awareness; Desrosiers et al., 2014). In other
words, mindful attention and non-judgmental awareness short-circuit restricted attentional focus
that impairs cognitive performance and triggers conditioned patterns of behavior that lead to
habitual identification with and reinforcement of negative emotions (Chambers, Gullone, &
Allen, 2009). Put another way, mindful attention and nonjudgmental acceptance together
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interrupt the cognitive processes that predict depression (Gilbert & Christopher, 2010). The
current study, therefore, explores mindfulness as a construct reflecting both attention and nonjudgmental awareness, which is hypothesized to be related to depression, via biased attention and
interpretation.
1.5.2.1 Mindfulness, attention bias, and depression. What empirical evidence links
specific cognitive biases (i.e., attention, interpretation) with mindfulness and depression?
Although very little research has examined mindfulness, attention bias and depression, one study
(Gilbert & Christopher, 2010) found a significant relationship between negative cognitions and
depression only in participants with low levels of mindful attention; in other words, those high in
mindful attention were protected from depression. Similarly, De Raedt et al. (2012) demonstrate
that lower levels of mindfulness are related to greater attention towards negative stimuli and
higher levels of depression severity. Higher mindfulness, alternatively, is associated with a
reduction in the inhibition of positive information. Second, mindfulness practices have been
found to reduce habitual responding and decrease rumination (Kiken & Shook, 2011), which is a
kind of negative attention bias common in depression. People who are higher in mindfulness
have lower levels of depression because they ruminate less (Desrosiers et al., 2013).
1.5.2.2 Mindfulness, interpretation bias, and depression. The relationship between
interpretation bias and mindfulness has even more limited support in the literature. Kiken and
Shook (2011) conducted a randomized control trial that found participants in the brief
mindfulness intervention condition demonstrated more accurate categorization of positive and
negative stimuli than controls. Interestingly, this resulted from more accurate classification of
positive stimuli, which corresponded to a unique increase in optimism. These findings suggest
that mindfulness is indeed associated with more accurate and less negatively biased
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interpretations. The indirect effects of interpretation bias on the association between mindfulness
and depression have been the subject of only one study to date (Mayer et al., 2018). In this study,
the authors modeled interpretation bias as indirectly impacting (mediating) the relationship
between mindfulness and depression. They found a significant negative relationship between
mindfulness and interpretation bias, and a positive relationship between interpretation bias and
depression. When interpretation bias was included in the model, there was a reduction in the
strength of the direct relationship between mindfulness and depression, which provided support
for the role of interpretation bias as a partial mediator of the mindfulness-depression relationship.
The current study seeks to replicate these findings using an empirically-derived measure of
mindfulness, while simultaneously considering attention bias.
1.5.3 Mindful attention and non-judgmental acceptance may relate to depression through
distinct cognitive biases
One question addressed in the current project is whether mindfulness is best modeled as
(1) a unitary, multidimensional construct (i.e., a latent variable indicated by mindful attention
and non-judgmental acceptance) or (2) two separate, but related constructs. Some theory
suggests that attention and non-judgmental awareness may achieve their greatest impact on the
association between cognitive biases and depression by existing together as a unified
mechanism, but other data suggest a likelihood that mindful attention and non-judgmental
acceptance will each impact this association differentially, potentially even through specific
cognitive biases. In support of a unified model, consider that non-judgmental acceptance leads to
un-biased interpretations, but only in response to a broadened awareness of initial stimuli
resulting from mindful attention, that increases the breadth of interpretation possibilities. Other
evidence, however, suggests that mindfulness is best modeled by distinct, potentially unrelated,
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components. For example, some work demonstrates that these separate components of attention
and non-judgment work through different neural pathways: attention operates bottom-up in the
brain and non-judgmental awareness works top down, apparent in mirrored physiological
functioning, suggesting that the two factors of mindfulness may predict depression differentially
through different cognitive biases (Chiesa, 2013; Creswell & Lindsay, 2014). In predicting
depression then, it may be specifically through attention bias that mindful attention has an
impact, whereas non-judgmental acceptance may impact depression more strongly through
interpretation bias stemming from less biased initial attention. For instance, Mayer et al. (2018)
found that the non-judgmental awareness subscale of the Five Factor Mindfulness Questionnaire
(FFMQ) correlated with interpretation bias and depression, but the Observe (mindful attention)
subscale did not. Further, interpretation bias was found to be a partial mediator of the
relationship between non-judgmental awareness and depression, but not between depression and
observation (Mayer et al., 2018). Furthermore, at least one attempt to model mindfulness has
suggested that mindful attention and non-judgmental acceptance best remain separate, unrelated
dimensions (i.e., Coffey et al., 2010). The study at hand therefore proposes both (1) to uncover
the factor structure best supported by the data and (2) to test the hypothesis that the multiple
dimensions of mindfulness relate differentially to depression through different cognitive biases.
1.6 The present study
Mindfulness interventions are receiving increasing attention in pop-culture and
intervention development, but questions remain regarding how best to model mindfulness.
Furthermore, although dispositional mindfulness is related to lower levels of depression, a
significant problem during EA, little is known about the mechanisms that explain the association,
which could provide insight into prevention and treatment efforts. Theory, along with limited
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research, support the idea that mindfulness relates to depression indirectly via attention and
interpretation biases, but only one study has examined such a model, and then only with
interpretation bias. Given that attention and interpretation biases both relate to depression and
have been shown to relate to one another temporally (attention bias is associated with
interpretation bias, which is in turn associated with depression; Sanchez et al., 2017), the current
study proposes to examine the indirect effects of attention and interpretation biases on the
relationship between mindfulness and depression. Further, the present study proposes to examine
whether the attention and non-judgmental awareness factors of mindfulness relate differently to
attention and interpretation biases, or if a unified mindfulness factor consisting of both achieves
a greater effect.
1.6.1 Aim 1
Theory suggests that both mindful attention and non-judgmental acceptance are integral
to the construct of mindfulness (Bishop et al., 2004), however the existence of these two factors
of mindfulness and the existence of mindfulness as a latent construct need more empirical
attention. Aim 1 will use advanced statistical modeling techniques to uncover the factor structure
of mindfulness as it best fits with the current data. The structure of mindfulness identified by
Coffey et al. (2010) that indicates the existence of separate attention and non-judgmental
acceptance factors will be more thoroughly assessed using the full scale of items. Further, the
existence of a unified mindfulness factor will be tested.
1.6.2 Aim 2
Using the model generated from Aim 1, Aim 2 will examine the relationships among
mindfulness, the cognitive biases of attention and interpretation, and depression; no prior studies
have considered the indirect effects of both attention and interpretation biases on the
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mindfulness-depression link. As such, the current study will examine separate models exploring
the order of attention and interpretation biases in the pathway between the factors of mindfulness
and depression. Broadly, it is hypothesized that a model with mindfulness (using the factor
structure identified in Aim 1) predicting attention bias followed by interpretation bias, and in
turn depressive symptoms, will fit better than a model where interpretation bias precedes
attention bias in mediating the mindfulness-depression link.
1.6.3 Aim 3
The third aim of the present study is exploratory in nature. In Aim 1, the structure of
mindfulness will be identified and utilized in Aim 2 to test the directional relationship between
positive and negative attention and interpretation biases in the context of mindfulness and
depression. Depending on what emerges from analyses in Aim 1 (i.e., if a unified mindfulness
construct is indicated), it may be necessary to use the separate the dimensions of mindfulness,
rather than a latent mindfulness variable, to facilitate exploration of the specific differential
associations between the facets of mindfulness and the two cognitive biases. Namely, we will
investigate the specificity of the associations between the individual facets of mindfulness and
depression via their unique contributions to attention and interpretation biases. We propose that
mindful attention will be more strongly associated with attention bias, and non-judgmental
acceptance more strongly associated with biased interpretation. Again, in light of previous
research revealing different results with negative and positive cognitive biases, the present study
will consider models examining positive and negative biases separately.
2

METHODS

2.1 Participant sample and recruitment
Archival data from the Picture This! randomized control trial, designed to assess the
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efficacy of a technology-based positive psychology intervention, were utilized. A sample of 258
EAs, including undergraduate and graduate students, was recruited between 2013 and 2015from
a northeastern university and the surrounding area, using the psychology subject pool, flyers, and
online advertisements. Participants with mental health concerns were targeted via flyer
placement at the university counseling center. Eligibility requirements for the study included (1)
being at least 18 years of age, (2) enrollment in a local college or university, (3) possession of a
smartphone with daily internet access, (4) willing to participate for the duration of 21 days, and
(5) capable of returning 4-5 weeks after baseline assessment to complete a follow-up visit.
2.2 Procedure
Eligible participants provided informed consent prior to completing approximately 1.5
hours of baseline questionnaires and computerized assessments. As part of the larger trial,
participants also completed online surveys daily for 21 days, and returned approximately 30 days
post baseline to complete follow-up questionnaires and computer assessments. Only data
collected during the baseline assessment were used in the present study.
2.3 Measures
2.3.1 Demographics and mental health history
A self-report questionnaire created for this study was used to collect information about
participant sex, age, and race/ethnicity.
Table 1 Demographic characteristics of sample (n = 258)
Variable
Age (years)
Female (%)
Race/Ethnicity
Caucasian
African-American
Latino
Other

Mean
19.85

SD
2.31

Percent
75.2
74.8
3.1
8.1
14.0
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2.3.2 Mindfulness
Mindfulness was measured using the Carolina Empirically Derived Mindfulness
Inventory (CEDMI; Coffey, Hartman, & Fredrickson, 2010). This measure consists of thirty-two
self-report items reflecting three subscales. Items are scored on a Likert scale from 1, “never or
rarely true,” to 5, “very often or always true” and items on two of the scales are reverse coded so
that higher levels of mindfulness are indicated by higher sum scores. In the development of the
CEDMI, Coffey et al. (2010) identified eight items from the Non-judgmental Acceptance
subscale of the FFMQ (e.g., “I tell myself that I shouldn’t be thinking the way I’m thinking”
[reverse-scored]), and six items from the Acceptance subscale of the Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004; e.g., “When I’m upset, I become embarrassed
for feeling that way” [reverse scored]) to indicate a latent factor reflecting non-judgmental
acceptance, understood as reflecting one’s ability to non-judgmentally accept their thoughts,
emotions, and surroundings. They additionally identified a present moment attention factor using
eight items from the Observe subscale of the Five Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire, capturing
awareness of sensations in the body, stimuli in the environment, and emotions (FFMQ; Baer,
Smith, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006; e.g., “I notice how foods and drinks affect my
thoughts, bodily sensations, and emotions”). The CEDMI has been found to have Cronbach’s
alphas ranging from .84 - .94 (Cameron & Fredrickson, 2015; Catalino, Algoe, & Fredrickson,
2014). In the current study, the Cronbach’s alpha was .89.
2.3.3 Cognitive biases
2.3.3.1 Attention bias. Attention bias was assessed using the computerized dot probe
task, originally developed by MacLeod, Mathews, and Tata (1986). Biased attending to positive
(happy) and negative (sad) stimuli was assessed using images of emotional faces chosen from the
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Pictures of Facial Affect (Ekman & Friesen, 1976). Following a practice trial during which
computerized feedback was provided to ensure task understanding, participants completed 34
trials. Each trial consisted of an initial fixation cross that appeared in the middle of the screen,
followed by an adjacent pair of faces that remained on the screen for 500ms. Each pair included
one face with a neutral expression, and another face expressing either happy or sad emotion.
Following the presentation of the images, participants were asked to respond to a subsequent
probe on the right or left side of a black screen, in place of either the neutral or affective face.
Average response times were calculated according to the placement of the probe behind the
neutral, sad, or happy faces independently, reflecting attention allocation (Gotlib & Joormann,
2010). Response latencies greater than 2.5 SD from the mean of each individual were discarded
on the basis of assuming distraction rather than exceptionally long response time and guessing or
accidental button pressing rather than especially fast response times. Trials for which the
incorrect button was pressed were also discarded. Attention bias towards happy and sad faces
was indicated by positive scores, reflecting longer response times to the probe when it appears on
the opposite side of the screen than the emotional stimuli (incongruent), compared to when it
appears on the same side (congruent). Attention bias away from happy and sad faces was
evidenced by longer response latencies on congruent versus incongruent trials, and indicated by
negative scores (Kujawa et al., 2011). Scores around 0 reflect a lack of bias in either direction.
Attention bias scores were calculated for happy and sad valences separately. Internal consistency
values for the dot probe task were consistent with those reported in the literature.
2.3.3.2 Interpretation bias. Interpretation bias was assessed with the Scrambled
Sentence Task developed by Wenzlaff and Bates (1998). Participants were presented twenty-five
sets of six scrambled words and asked to use five of the words to form a complete sentence by
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placing a number over each of the five words indicating their order. For example:
4 1

3

5

2

born I loser a winner am
Each set could be unscrambled to make a positively or negatively valenced sentence. Participants
were instructed to work as quickly as possible, move on in the instance of mistakes, and choose
only one solution. They had three minutes to complete the task. In order to induce cognitive load,
participants were told to remember a six-digit number immediately prior to beginning the task,
which they were asked to recall at the end of the three minutes. This requires mental capacity,
which has been demonstrated to impair one’s ability to control the suppression of negative
cognitions, therefore increasing the likelihood that existing negative biases will become apparent
(Van der Does, W., 2010). Only logical unscrambled sentences using exactly five words were
scored. Each sentence was scored as a positive or negative interpretation. Interpretation bias
scores were derived for positive and negative valences separately by calculating a ratio of the
number of sentences unscrambled with each valence to the total number of unscrambled
sentences. Previous studies using the Scrambled Sentence Task report adequate internal
consistency (Van der Does, W., 2010). Cronbach’s alpha for the current study was .79.
2.3.4 Depressive symptomatology
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) was utilized to
assess depressive symptoms with 20 self-report items. An item measuring suicide risk on the
original scale was not administered. Participants indicated the degree to which each symptom
(sadness, loss of interest and pleasure, tiredness and fatigue, changes in sleep and appetite,
irritability, indecisiveness and concentration difficulty, and worthlessness) was experienced over
the prior two week period. Response options for each item ranged from zero to three, with higher
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scores representing more severe symptomatology. A sum score was computed for the scale.
Total scores ranging from 0 to 12 indicate no depression, scores 13 to 19 signal mild depression
or dysthymia, and scores 20 and above indicate that clinically significant dysthymia or MDD is
likely (Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). The BDI-II has been validated for use with emerging
adults (Whisman & Perez, 2000). Reported Cronbach’s alphas for the BDI-II ranged from .74.90 in recent studies (Storch, Roberti, & Roth, 2004), and was .88 for the current sample.
2.4 Data analysis
Analyses were conducted in Mplus, version 8.1 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Missing data
and violations of multivariate non-normality and independence were accounted for by the use of
Maximum Likelihood estimation with Robust standard errors (MLR; Kwok, Cheung, Jak, Ryu,
& Wu, 2018; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). Fit for each model was assessed using multiple fit
indices to account for their variable strengths and weaknesses. The chi-square test was used to
evaluate model accuracy, with good fit signified by a non-significant value, indicating the lack of
difference between the hypothesized model and the true model in the data. Since the chi square
test can be sensitive to sample size, Root Mean Squared Error (RMSEA; Browne & Cudeck,
1993), which is not, was also examined to evaluate the reproducibility of the model. RMSEA
values less than .06 are generally accepted to indicate good fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999). The
Comparative Fit Index (CFI; Bentler, 1990) and the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI; Tucker & Lewis,
1973) were also used, with values greater than 0.95 and 0.90, respectively, indicating good fit.
Lastly, the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) was used to supplement the RMSEA,
CFI, and TLI measures, with values below .08 signifying acceptable fit (Hu & Bentler, 1999).
In models demonstrating good fit, standardized path coefficients were used to evaluate
the strength of relationships between variables, with coefficients with values less than .10
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representing a small effect, 0.30 or greater a medium effect, and 0.50 or higher a large effect. A
bootstrapping technique with 1,000 replications was used to generate confidence intervals for
hypothesized indirect effects, in order to correct for non-normality typically present in most
estimates of the like (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). Effects were determined as significant based on
an alpha of 0.05.
2.4.1 Analysis for Aim 1
A series of Confirmatory Factor (CFA) analyses and Exploratory Structural Equation
(ESEM) Models were used to test the factor structure of the data collected with the CEDMI and
to attempt to model an overarching mindfulness factor (see Figures 1-6 below). CFAs allow
researchers to test pre-specified models, but in CFA models, all items are forced to load on only
one predicted factor and are not allowed to loading on any other factors. While this approach is
the multivariate technique most widely used, it can be overly restrictive and frequently fails to
result in models that meet acceptable measurement standards (Marsh, Morin, Parker, & Kaur,
2014). Historically, the alternative approach has been Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), which
identifies patterns of latent variables in the data that the researcher then interprets. EFAs are
often criticized for their lack of guiding a priori theory. It is also difficult to incorporate latent
EFA factors into additional analyses. Recently, ESEM has been developed as an alternative
approach to model identification that incorporates the ideal aspects of CFA and EFA. ESEM is
less restrictive than CFA, and unlike EFA, maintains the ability to test pre-specified models and
makes it easy to use identified factors in subsequent analyses (Marsh et al., 2014). ESEM
accomplishes this by using target rotation to confirm a priori factor structures, while also
allowing variables to cross-load onto other factors (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2009; Morin, Arens,
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& Marsh, 2015). Finally, it still produces traditional fit indices to allow for estimation of model
fit.
In the current study, six separate models using CFA and ESEM to test the factor structure
of the thirty-two items on the CEDMI were compared (Coffey et al., 2010). The first model used
CFA to indicate (1) an attention factor comprised of items identified by the CEDMI to be on the
attention subscale, (2) a non-judgment factor consisting of non-judgment subscale items, (3) an
acceptance factor made up of items from the acceptance subscale, (4) a second order nonjudgmental acceptance factor (non-judgmental acceptance – NJAC) made up of the separate nonjudgment and acceptance lower order factors, and (5) a hierarchal mindfulness factor comprised
of the second order non-judgmental acceptance factor and the lower order attention factor
(Figure 1). Second, to mirror the structure proposed to exist in the CEDMI, a second CFA was
run to test the same structure from the first model, but without the hierarchical mindfulness
factor (Figure 2). Third, using the three factors indicated by the CEDMI subscales, we ran a CFA
to test the existence of (1) a hierarchical mindfulness factor, (2) indicated by the three separate
subscales (Figure 3). Fourth, an ESEM was conducted to test a lower-level structure whereby the
three factors of attention, non-judgment, and acceptance were indicated by the items on their
respective CEDMI subscales, while allowing items from other subscales to load freely where
they fit best (Figure 4). Fifth, a bi-factor CFA used CEDMI items to indicate the three separate
subscale factors and simultaneously an overarching non-judgmental acceptance bi-factor using
all items from the CEDMI non-judgment and acceptance subscales (Figure 5). Finally, ESEM
was used to test a similar bi-factor model, while allowing more freedom for the true factor
structure to emerge, including the possibility for the bi-factor to be indicated by items from all
three CEDMI subscales, including attention (Figure 6).
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Model fit was determined by the criteria outlined above. Since maximum likelihood
estimation was used to account for potential non-normality, the chi-square comparison test
traditionally used to compare models was not appropriate since the distribution of the data may
not be chi-square distributed. To account for this, models were compared using the SatorraBentler scaled chi-square test, which uses a corrected chi-square value to compare nested models
(Satorra & Bentler, 2010).

Figure 1

Figure 3

Figure 2

Figure 4
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Figure 5

Figure 6

2.4.2 Analysis for Aim 2
Using the best fitting model from Aim 1, structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used
to examine the direct and indirect effects of mindfulness on attention bias, interpretation bias,
and depression, as well as the direct and indirect effects of attention bias on interpretation bias
and depression (Figure 7). Two models were tested, one for negative attention and interpretation
biases and a second for positive biases. Two additional models for positive and negative biases
were analyzed to test the direction of cognitive biases, such that in the second set of models,
mindfulness predicted interpretation bias, which in turn predicted attention bias, followed by
depression (Figure 8). Model fit was then compared for the two sets of models according to
differences in Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) values, with the smallest AIC value indicating
the best fit, and a difference of 10 or greater preferred (Burnham & Anderson, 2004).
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Figure 7 The indirect effects on the relationship between mindfulness and depressive symptoms
via attention bias to interpretation bias, run separately for positive and negative biases.

Figure 8 The indirect effects on the relationship between mindfulness and depressive symptoms
via interpretation bias to attention bias, run separately for positive and negative biases.
2.4.3 Analysis for Aim 3
The third aim of the present study was exploratory in nature. In Aim 1, the best fitting
model of mindfulness was identified. Aim 2 utilized this model to test the directional relationship
between attention and interpretation biases in the context of mindfulness and depression. In Aim
3, we used the same models from Aim 2 to explore the differential associations between the
factors of mindfulness and the two cognitive biases in the model predicting depression. To
explore the specificity of these relationships, we compared the differential direct and indirect
effects between each of the mindfulness factors and attention, interpretation bias, and depression.
This was done separately for negative and positive biases.
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2.4.3 Sample size and statistical power considerations.
According to guidelines by Bentler and Chou (1987), to achieve sufficient power, SEM
models should use a sample size consisting of 5 or 10 observations per parameter. Along with
the minimum sample size of 100 to 200 suggested by Boomsma (1985), a sample size of at least
200 was expected to account for the 12 parameters in the largest model and to be sufficient to
achieve power of .80 at an alpha of .05. Therefore, the current sample of 258 participants should
have sufficient power.
3 RESULTS
3.1 Preliminary analyses
Missing data ranged from 1% to 19%, which was accounted for with the use of
Maximum Likelihood estimation with Robust standard errors in subsequent analyses (MLR;
Kwok, Cheung, Jak, Ryu, & Wu, 2018; Muthén & Muthén, 2012). On the BDI-II, 14.3% of
participants had a sum score of 20 or above, indicating they likely had clinically significant
dysthymia or depression; 19.2% of participants had scores between 13 and 19, signifying mild
depression or dysthymia; and 66.5% of participants fell in the normative range with scores of 12
or below. None of the model variables differed based on demographic characteristics (i.e., sex);
as a result, demographic variables were not included as controls in subsequent models.
3.2 Results for Aim 1
3.2.1 Identifying the best fitting measurement model
A total of six models of mindfulness were run (Figures 1-6). One model was not
identified and was therefore discarded (Figure 1). The remaining five models were compared
according to their model fit, using the Satorra-Bentler chi square difference test, due to the
nested nature of the models. A nested model is one that is more restricted than the model from
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which it was created. CFA models are nested in ESEM models, and hierarchical models are
nested in bi-factor models (Chen et al., 2006). With this in mind, model 3 was nested in model 2,
and was the first model comparison. Since model 3 demonstrated better fit, it was then compared
to model 4, since it was nested in model 4. Model 4 was evidenced to be better fitting, and since
it was nested in model 5, that comparison followed. The fit of model 5 was proven to be
superior. Since model 2 was also nested in model 5, that comparison was made and confirmed
model 5 was the better fit. Finally, models 3, 4, and 5 were all nested within each other and thus
compared, revealing model 6, the bi-factor ESEM, to have the best fit overall (Figure 6; χ2 (149)
= 307.12, p = <0.001, CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.905, RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.064 [0.054, 0.075],
SRMR = 0.031). Table 2 details the model fit for all six models and comparisons between them.
Model 6 was used in subsequent SEM models to simultaneously test Aims 2 and 3. The
correlations among factors in this model and all other variables in the SEM models in Aims 2
and 3 are provided in Table 3.
Table 2 Model Fit for Mindfulness Measurement Models Tested in Aim 1
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Table 3 Correlations between study variables

3.2.2 The factors of mindfulness
The best fitting model identified a bi-factor made up of all items from the NJ and AC
items (NJAC), with marginal contributions from the ATT items, as well as additional group
factors over and above the bi-factor for attention (ATT), non-judgment (NJ), and acceptance
(AC) (see Figure 9 and Table 4). A single mindfulness factor that encompasses attention,
acceptance, and non-judgment did not emerge. The NJAC bi-factor is mathematically orthogonal
to the other factors and therefore not correlated with them. While the group factors were allowed
to correlate with each other, only NJ and AC came close to correlating in a positive direction, but
the relationship did not reach significance (see Table 3).
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Figure 9 Best Fitting Mindfulness Measurement Model: A Bi-factor ESEM
Notes. ESEM = Exploratory Structure Equation Model; NJAC = Non-judgmental Acceptance; ATT = Attention; NJ = Nonjudgment; AC = Acceptance; solid line = significant positive association; dashed line = significant negative association; dotted
line = trending association. Item numbers and subscales from the Carolina Empirically Derived Mindfulness Inventory (CEDMI)
are shown in the center. Only significant pathways are depicted. See Table 4 for standardized estimates of factor loadings and
their standard errors.

Table 4 Factor Loadings for Best Fitting Mindfulness Measurement Model
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3.3. Results for Aim 2
Aim 1 demonstrated that there was not an overarching, latent mindfulness factor. With
this in mind, analyses for Aims 2 and 3 were run in the same four models using the bi-factor
ESEM model (Figure 9), which was the best fitting. To test Aim 2’s hypothesis about the
directional effects of the relationship between attention and interpretation bias, four total models
were run. Two models, one for positive and one for negative biases, had each of the four
mindfulness factors (including the bi-factor) predicting attention bias, which predicted
interpretation bias, which predicted depression (Figures 10 and 12). A second set of models were
run, separately for positive and negative biases, with each of the mindfulness factors predicting
interpretation bias, to attention bias, to depression (Figures 11 and 13).
For models with both happy and sad biases, fit was better when interpretation bias
preceded attention bias in predicting depressive symptoms (see Table 5; sad biases, Figure 11: χ2
(207) =394.52, p = <0.000, CFI = 0.933, TLI = 0.903, RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.059 [0.058, 0.068],
SRMR = 0.038; happy biases, Figure 13: χ2 (207) = 378.85, p = <0.000, CFI = 0.939, TLI =
0.911, RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.057 [0.048, 0.066], SRMR = 0.036), than when attention bias
preceded interpretation bias (sad biases, Figure 10: χ2 (207) = 438.03 , p = <0.000, CFI = 0.918,
TLI = 0.881, RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.066 [0.057, 0.074], SRMR = 0.080; happy biases, Figure 12:
χ2 (207) = 427.49, p = <0.000, CFI = 0.921, TLI 0.886, RMSEA [90% CI] = 0.064 [0.056,
0.073], SRMR = 0.075). Additionally, comparison based on differences between AIC and BIC
values also indicated that for both positive and negative biases, models predicting depressive
symptoms with interpretation bias preceding attention bias (Figures 11 and 13) fit better than
those where attention bias preceded interpretation bias (Figures 10 and 12; see Table 5).
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Table 5 Model fit for SEM models

3.4 Results for Aim 3
Aim 3 examined the direct and indirect effects of the relationships between variables in
the same four models used in Aim 2 above. Specifically, the hypothesized relationships between
ATT and attention bias, and NJAC and interpretation bias, in the context of depression, were
examined.
3.4.1 Direct effects
The direct effects between all study variables are presented in Table 6. While the values
of direct effects were different depending on valence of bias (negative versus positive) and order
of biases, all models revealed similar patterns.
Each model tested the direct effects from the factors of mindfulness to depressive
symptoms. Across all four models, neither the attention nor non-judgment factors of mindfulness
significantly predicted depressive symptoms. The acceptance factor, however, always
significantly predicted depression in a negative direction (Figure 10: β = -0.150, p = 0.032;
Figure 11: β = -0.136, p = 0.037; Figure 12: β = -0.160, p = 0.025; Figure 13: β = -0.154, p =
0.021), though the effect was small. Additionally, across all four models, the non-judgmental
acceptance bi-factor more strongly negatively predicted depression compared to the acceptance
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factor, with a medium effect size (Figure 10: β = -0.468, p = 0.000; Figure 11: β = -0.410, p =
0.000; Figure 12: β = -0.491, p = 0.000; Figure 13: β = -0.440, p = 0.000).
Direct effects were only tested from the mindfulness factors to either interpretation bias
or attention bias, depending on which bias came first in the model. In other words, for models
with interpretation bias preceding attention bias, only the relationships between the factors of
mindfulness and interpretation bias were examined, and in models when attention bias preceded
interpretation bias, the mindfulness factors were only examined in relation to attention bias.
For models examining attention bias followed by interpretation bias, neither the nonjudgment (NJ), acceptance (AC), nor non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC) factors significantly
predicted attention bias, regardless of whether the biases were positive or negative. However, the
relationship between the attention factor (ATT) and attention bias was close to significant for
positive biases (Figure 12: β = -0.123, p = 0.055), and fully reached significance for negative
biases (Figure 10: β = 0.162, p = 0.028), though the effect was small.
In models when interpretation bias came before attention bias, the relationship between
the attention mindfulness factor (ATT) and interpretation bias was not significant in the model
with negative biases but was trending in the context of biases that were positive (Figure 13: β =
0.127, p = 0.071). The non-judgment factor (NJ) significantly predicted interpretation bias in the
model with positive biases (Figure 13: β = 0.283, p = 0.038), and that relationship was close to
reaching significance in the model with negative bias (Figure 11: β = - 0.270, p = 0.051), though
the effects of both were small. The opposite pattern was apparent for the relationship between the
acceptance factor (AC) and interpretation bias. AC significantly predicted interpretation bias in
the model with negative biases (Figure 11: β = - 0.191, p = 0.035), and was close to significance
for positive biases (Figure 13: β = 0.163, p = 0.062). The effects were again small. In models
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with both happy and sad biases, the non-judgmental bi-factor (NJAC) had a significant medium
effect on interpretation bias (Figure 11: β = - 0.328, p = 0.011; Figure 13: β = 0.283, p = 0.027).
None of the models revealed a significant direct effect between attention bias and
interpretation bias, or attention bias and depressive symptoms. On the other hand, interpretation
bias significantly predicted depression in all four models. Negative interpretation bias had a
medium positive effect on depressive symptoms (Figure 10: β = 0.393, p = 0.000; Figure 11: β =
0.373, p = 0.000), and positive interpretation bias had a medium negative effect on depression
(Figure 12: β = -0.351, p = 0.000; Figure 13: β = -0.334, p = 0.000).
In considering how much depression, attention bias, and interpretation bias effected the
models, all models with both negative/sad biases and positive/happy biases had a significant R2
for depression (Figure 10: R2 = 0.428, p = 0.000; Figure 11: R2 = 0.510, p = 0.000; Figure 12: R2
= 0.421, p = 0.000; Figure 13: R2 = 0.491, p = 0.000). Attention bias did not have a significant
effect on any model. Interpretation bias, however, did significantly affect the models for both sad
and happy biases, but only when it preceded attention bias in predicting depressive symptoms
(Figure 11: R2 = 0.251, p = 0.000; Figure 13: R2 = 0.236, p = 0.002;). Based on guidelines by
Cohen (1992) these results demonstrate that for both positive and negative biases, depression had
a large effect on all models, while interpretation bias had a medium to large effect on the models
in which it came before attention bias.
Taken together, the results show that attention bias did not significantly predict
depression for positive or negative biases, but interpretation bias did for both negative and
positive biases. The relationship between attention bias and interpretation bias never reached
significance. Looking at mindfulness, ATT and NJ never predicted depression, while AC and
NJAC always did, regardless of what valence the biases were. The only mindfulness factor that
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significantly predicted attention bias was ATT for negative biases, though the direction of the
relationship was unexpected; it was positive, indicating that greater levels of ATT predicted
higher levels of negative attention bias. ATT for positive biases was trending in relationship to
attention bias and was also opposite to expectations in that higher levels of ATT predicted lower
levels of attention bias to positive stimuli. The picture is even more nuanced when considering
the relationship between mindfulness and interpretation bias. The NJAC mindfulness factor was
the only one that fully reached significance in predicting interpretation bias for both positive and
negative biases, though the relationship between AC and interpretation bias was significant for
sad biases, and nearing significance for happy biases, and the NJ-interpretation bias effect was
significant for happy biases and close in sad. ATT was trending towards significantly predicting
interpretation biases for positive biases, but not for negative ones. In other words, the only
mindfulness factor that did not come close to significantly predicting interpretation bias was
ATT in models with negative biases.
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Table 6 Standardized results for direct associations between bifactor mindfulness ESEM factors
and outcomes

Figure 10 Standardized direct effects in model with mindfulness factors predicting depressive
symptoms via attention bias followed by interpretation bias for negative/sad biases
** p <.01, * p < .05, † p < .1
Notes. Figures with even numbers (10 and 12) refer to those where attention bias precedes interpretation bias in predicting
depressive symptoms. Figures with odd numbers (11 and 13) refer to those where interpretation bias precedes attention bias in
predicting depressive symptoms; standardized direct effects are only indicated for significant paths.
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Figure 11 Standardized direct effects in model with mindfulness factors predicting depressive
symptoms via interpretation bias followed by attention bias for negative/sad biases
** p <.01, * p < .05, † p < .1
Notes. Figures with even numbers (10 and 12) refer to those where attention bias precedes interpretation bias in predicting
depressive symptoms. Figures with odd numbers (11 and 13) refer to those where interpretation bias precedes attention bias in
predicting depressive symptoms; standardized direct effects are only indicated for significant paths .

Figure 12 Standardized direct effects in model with mindfulness factors predicting depressive
symptoms via attention bias followed by interpretation bias for positive/happy biases
** p <.01, * p < .05, † p < .1
Notes. Figures with even numbers (10 and 12) refer to those where attention bias precedes interpretation bias in predicting
depressive symptoms. Figures with odd numbers (11 and 13) refer to those where interpretation bias precedes attention bias in
predicting depressive symptoms; standardized direct effects are only indicated for significant paths.
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Figure 13 Standardized direct effects in model with mindfulness factors predicting depressive
symptoms via interpretation bias followed by attention bias for positive/happy biases
** p <.01, * p < .05, † p < .1
Notes. Figures with even numbers (10 and 12) refer to those where attention bias precedes interpretation bias in predicting
depressive symptoms. Figures with odd numbers (11 and 13) refer to those where interpretation bias precedes attention bias in
predicting depressive symptoms; standardized direct effects are only indicated for significant paths .

3.4.2 Indirect effects
The indirect effects from each of the four mindfulness factors to depression through
attention bias to interpretation bias (Figures 10 and 12), and through interpretation bias to
attention bias (Figures 11 and 13) are detailed for positive and negative biases in Table 7. None
of the indirect paths from any of the four mindfulness factors to depressive symptoms via
attention and interpretation biases, regardless of their order, were significant. However, when
only the path from mindfulness to depression through interpretation bias was examined (i.e., not
including attention bias) significant indirect effects from NJAC to depressive symptoms through
interpretation bias for both positive (β = -0.095, p = 0.038) and negative biases (β = -0.125, p =
0.011) emerged.
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Table 7 Standardized results for indirect pathways from bifactor mindfulness ESEM factors to
depressive symptoms through attention and interpretation bias

4 DISCUSSION
With the proliferation of mindfulness-based interventions, there is a need for evidencebased research to better understand the construct and measurement of mindfulness as well as the
mechanisms through which it may influence mental health. Depression, one of the most common
mental illnesses in EA, has been the target of many mindfulness-based interventions. However,
little is known about how mindfulness may operate to influence this growing public health
concern. One potential mechanism through which mindfulness may relate to depression is
through cognitive biases. Much previous research has considered the roles of cognitive biases,
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like attention and interpretation bias, in relation to depression, but investigation of how such
biases are associated with mindfulness is almost non-existent. Nonetheless, there is an abundance
of theory that outlines why these constructs may be related. Further, little work has examined the
potential interplay of these specific biases. With this in mind, the current study sought to
contribute to the literature by 1) testing a measurement model of mindfulness to better
understand the construct and how it may be operating, 2) examining the indirect effects of both
positive and negative attention and interpretation biases in the mindfulness-depression
relationship, and 3) exploring the nuanced relationships between the factors of mindfulness and
distinct cognitive biases.
4.1 The Structure of mindfulness
Aim 1 of the current study sought to elucidate the empirical structure of mindfulness in a
sample of EAs. Exploratory structural equation modeling (ESEM) was used to discover and
confirm a more accurate factor structure than is possible when using EFA or CFA alone, as it
predicts which items will load on certain factors, but simultaneously allows all items to
contribute to all factors. Comparison of ESEM and CFA models revealed the best fitting model
of mindfulness to consist of four factors. A non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC) bi-factor was
indicated, which was collectively composed of items primarily from the non-judgment (NJ) and
acceptance (AC) scales (1 item was from the ATT scale). Three factors were also determined to
represent attention, acceptance, and non-judgment, above and beyond the NJAC bi-factor.
In contradiction to the hypothesis of Aim 1, an over-arching (i.e., latent) mindfulness
factor was not found. Rather, the factor structure confirms some previous assertions that presentmoment attention to one’s experiences and a non-judgmental approach to interpreting them
should be considered as distinct components of mindfulness that do not necessarily indicate a
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latent mindfulness construct and that may influence independent mechanisms and outcomes. In
fact, the present study replicated Coffey et al.’s (2010) findings that suggest mindfulness is
composed of two factors reflecting attention and acceptance (non-judgment), without an
overarching mindfulness construct. Current findings also support Bishop et al.’s (2004) theory
that proposes a two-component structure of mindfulness, reflecting the different, but equally
important, dimensions of attention and non-judgment. Almost all definitions of mindfulness
include these dual-components but lack clarity on whether they are underlying indicators of a
latent mindfulness construct or are best modeled as distinct, even unrelated, components. The
replication of Coffey et al.’s (2010) model adds one additional piece of evidence to the literature
base (Mayer et al., 2018). Of course, it should be noted that we used the measure developed by
Coffey and colleagues and focused on an EA sample as they did, so future research should
continue to explore the structure of mindfulness and the possibility of a latent mindfulness factor
with other measures in other samples.
While the acceptance factor in Coffey et al.’s (2010) model was indicated by two
separate scales reflecting non-judgment and acceptance, they did not consider these components
as independent factors. In contrast, our model confirmed the existence of acceptance and nonjudgment as two different factors reflecting additional dimensions of mindfulness above and
beyond the combined non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC) bi-factor. By confirming acceptance
and non-judgment as separate factors, we were then able to explore their unique interactions with
other variables in subsequent models, in addition to examining their combined impact.
Interestingly, the attention factor did not correlate with either the non-judgment or
acceptance factor. While this is consistent with some previous research failing to find a
significant association between attention and non-judgment (Baer at al., 2006; Coffey et al.,
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2010), it is counter to other work that has found a significant negative correlation between the
factors (Baer et al., 2004). One possible reason for the discrepancy may be explained by
differences between novice and experienced meditators (Baer at al., 2006). Coffey et al., for
example, reported a significant negative correlation between the two factors in a sub-sample of
their participants who reported no regular meditation practice. They did not find a significant
association between attention and acceptance for frequent meditators (defined as at least once a
week over the previous six months). Unfortunately, frequency of meditation practice was not
collected for the current sample, so this moderation could not be examined. Future studies should
be intentional about examining how varying levels of meditation experience may influence the
structure of mindfulness as well as how it relates to other constructs.
In sum, the best fitting model resultant from analyses in Aim 1 did not support a single
latent mindfulness factor but rather highlights the importance of evaluating present-moment
attention, non-judgment, acceptance, and non-judgmental acceptance as separate dimensions.
With this in mind, these four factors found in Aim 1 (attention, acceptance, non-judgment, and
non-judgmental acceptance) were used as the starting point for Aim 2 and 3 analyses, which
were conducted simultaneously in the same four models. Since the factor structure of
mindfulness found in Aim 1 identified discrete factors, it was not necessary to separate them for
the intentional purpose of exploring specific relationships.
4.2 Considering the direction and combined effects of attention and interpretation biases in
the relationship between mindfulness and depressive symptoms
In light of little extant research about 1) the relationship between attention bias and
interpretation bias, and 2) the relationship between these cognitive biases and mindfulness, Aims
2 and 3 used the measurement model found to be the best fit from Aim 1 to simultaneously test
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the directional effects of attention bias and interpretation bias in the relationship between
mindfulness and depressive symptoms, as well as the specificity of the relationships between the
factors of mindfulness, attention bias and interpretations bias, and depressive symptoms.
To test the directional effects of the cognitive biases, models with mindfulness predicting
depressive symptoms via attention bias, followed by interpretation bias, were compared to
models with interpretation bias preceding attention bias in the mindfulness-depression
relationship. Models considered positive and negative biases separately for a total of four
models. Comparison of the models revealed that for both happy and sad biases, model fit was
better when interpretation bias preceded attention bias, rather than when attention bias preceded
interpretation bias. In fact, only one of the models with attention bias followed by interpretation
bias reached an acceptable fit threshold for any of the indices, and the other model only just met
the fit threshold for SRMR (SRMR was 0.075, with suggested cutoff under 0.08). Although
findings confirmed the general hypothesis that cognitive biases play a role in the mindfulnessdepression relationship, results ran counter to our specific hypotheses about the direction of
effects. Namely, we expected that mindfulness would more strongly influence depression by first
broadening one’s attention to stimuli outside the narrow range informed by negative information
processing networks and longstanding negative self-schemas (as reflected in decreased negative
attention bias and increased positive attention bias), which would then inform interpretation
biases, and finally fewer depressive symptoms. However, this hypothesized model was not the
best fitting. Rather, the model with the mindfulness factors predicting depressive symptoms
through interpretation bias followed by attention bias demonstrated relatively better fit. It is
important to note that examination of specific variable relationships (relevant to Aim 3) revealed
that attention bias was not significantly related to interpretation bias or depressive symptoms for
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models of positive or negative biases. Further, the only significant relation between the
dimensions of mindfulness and attention bias was between the ATT factor of mindfulness and
attention bias, but as discussed below (see section 4.2.2), this relationship was in the opposite
direction expected. Together, these results suggest that a model without attention bias altogether
may be more valid.
While these findings failed to support the hypothesis that attention bias would have a
significant impact on the model, there is conflicting evidence about the relationship between
attention bias and depression in the literature (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). Studies examining
depression and attention biases have produced varying results depending on the specifics of the
methodology. It has largely been found that mood induction before an experimental task, use of
depression-relevant pictorial stimuli, and longer presentation of the stimulus ( 500 ms) may be
required to capture attention bias as it manifests in depressed, at-risk, and remitted individuals
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). While we did present pictorial stimuli that are relevant to depression
during the dot probe task, we did not include a mood induction beforehand, and only exposed the
stimuli for 500 ms. This may explain while we failed to find an association between attention
bias and depression in the current sample.
It is possible to interpret the lack of association between attention bias and depression in
the current sample as either (1) a lack of direct association between the two, and/or (2) the
product of methodological limitations; however, our consideration of multiple biases at the same
time may have also had an impact. Very little research has examined the combined impact of
multiple biases at the same time, especially in the context of depression. Some theory suggests
that when multiple cognitive biases are considered at the same time, only one of them may
predict depression (Everaert et al, 2012). Everaert et al. (2013), for example, found that
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interpretation bias was related to depression but attention bias was not. To explain their finding,
they conjectured that some cognitive mechanisms may not be related to depression directly but
could be associated with other levels of processing that are. Perhaps attention bias and
depression are connected through a cognitive process other than interpretation bias, such as
memory. Support for this idea comes from a study that evidenced a direct relationship between
prolonged attention to negative words and negative memory bias (Everaert & Koster, 2020).
Unfortunately, we did not have data on memory biases available for the current study and were
thus unable to consider this possibility. Future research should explore the independent
relationship between mindfulness and attention bias, and the role of attention bias in the
mindfulness-depression link. Specific recommendations would be to create models that
incorporate cognitive biases other than interpretation bias, such as memory or rumination.
The current results demonstrate that attention bias does not directly relate to depression,
but that interpretation bias does. This replication of the role of interpretation bias in Everaert et
al. (2013) highlights interpretation bias as a key mechanism in depression. Indeed, the literature
demonstrates more robust evidence for an association between interpretation bias and depression
than between attention bias and depression (Beevers et al., 2009; Bisson & Sears, 2007; Hindash
& Amir, 2012). Further, cognitive bias modification has been demonstrated to reduce depressive
symptoms in part through a reduction in interpretation bias (Mayer et al., 2018). Additional
insight comes from studies that have found robust support for the contribution of interpretation
bias to a reduction of depressive symptoms in the context of mindfulness-based interventions
(Mayer et al., 2018). Taken together, these data point to the importance of the relations among
mindfulness, interpretation bias, and depression. The current results offer additional support by
replicating findings by Mayer et al. (2018), indicating that interpretation bias was directly related
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to both mindfulness and depression and also that positive, in addition to negative, interpretation
bias was a significant mediator of dispositional mindfulness and depression.
4.3 Exploring specificity in the relationships between the factors of mindfulness, cognitive
biases, and depression
4.3.1 Considering mindful attention
Aim 3 proposed that the attention factor of mindfulness (ATT) would significantly
predict attention bias in the model predicting depression. As mentioned above, the relationship
between ATT and attention bias was significant for negative biases, but in a positive direction,
whereby people who had higher levels of ATT had more negative attention bias. This was
opposite from what was hypothesized; it was expected that higher levels of ATT would be
related to less negatively biased attention. However, in light of the cross-sectional nature of the
data, this finding may reflect that mindful ATT perpetuates a pre-existing negative attention bias.
In other words, perhaps people with negative attention biases are initially more attentive to
present-moment stimuli in their environments, which is reflected in higher levels of ATT. Due to
activated negative schemas, however, they may have difficulty disengaging from negative
stimuli, which reinforces negatively biased attention (Beck, 2008), reflected in the positive
correlation between ATT and attention bias here. As this is the first study to examine the
relationship between mindfulness and attention bias, future research should continue to explore
this association, particularly in longitudinal studies.
4.3.2 Attention can be dangerous without non-judgmental acceptance
The positive relationship between mindful ATT and negative attention bias in the current
study may suggest that, on its own, without non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC), attention can be
detrimental. This suggestion was also made by Desrosiers and colleagues (2014), although they
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were considering the potential negative impact of attention on depressive symptoms (rather than
on attention bias). In their study, attention was positively associated with depression, but only in
the absence of acceptance/non-judgment.
Coffey and colleagues (2010) also have data that may help contextualize the current
associations between ATT and negative attention bias. They showed that mindful ATT and
NJAC may be best conceptualized as operating in sequence, with greater levels of NJAC
following from heightened present-moment ATT. In this sense, someone with present-moment
attention alone may have a negative attention bias, but when non-judgmental acceptance is
present as a mediator, that person may be able to more easily disengage from negative stimuli
and expand their awareness to a wider range of positive stimuli, in which case negative attention
bias would not manifest in negative mental health outcomes. In sum, the current findings add a
suggestion to the literature that in the absence of non-judgment or acceptance, mindful attention
and negative attention biases may be positively related. Future research should continue to
explore whether non-judgmental acceptance is equally impactful in isolation from presentmoment attention, above and beyond present-moment attention, or as a potential mediator of the
relationship between present-moment attention and other outcomes such as attention bias and
depressive symptoms.
4.3.3 Non-judgmental acceptance is important without attention
While mindful ATT can be detrimental without NJAC, NJAC may still be positively
impactful without ATT. The current findings revealed that at least one of three factors in our
mindfulness model (NJAC, AC, NJ) was significantly related to the cognitive biases, or
depression, or both, in every model. Across models where attention bias was followed by
interpretation bias, NJAC was never associated with attention bias, although the significant
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negative relation between NJAC and depression remained. In the models when interpretation
biases preceded attention bias, NJAC was significantly associated with interpretation bias
(predicting fewer negative biases and more positive biases) and negatively associated with
depression. Even when the positive connection between ATT and attention bias was present,
NJAC still predicted fewer depression symptoms.
These findings suggest that non-judgmental acceptance of one’s experience is key to
mindfulness, regardless of whether attention reflects expanded present-moment awareness or a
negative bias. In other words, even without present moment-attention, or with negative attention
bias, non-judgmental acceptance appears to be impactful. Research has demonstrated that the
non-judgmental acceptance dimension of mindfulness independently predicts mental health
outcomes, including depression, above and beyond attention, highlighting the primary role of
this mindfulness factor (Coffey et al., 2010; Mayer et al., 2018). In considering cognitive biases,
research by Herndon and colleagues (2008) showed that making fewer cognitive errors was
associated with mindfulness, above and beyond attention, and Mayer and colleagues found that
non-judgmental awareness mediated the association between interpretation bias and depression,
but mindful attention did not. In sum, our findings add further support to the literature that it is
indeed the non-reactive, open-minded way in which one observes that is associated with fewer
symptoms of depression through promoting less biased interpretations, regardless of the whether
the observations are good or bad (Cameron & Fredrickson, 2015; Coffey et al., 2010; Desrosiers
et al., 2014; Mayer et al., 2018).
4.3.4 The nuances of mindful non-judgment, acceptance, and non-judgmental acceptance
Based on the current findings and consistent with prior literature, non-judgmental
acceptance is proposed to be essential to mindfulness. However, throughout the literature, non-
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judgment (NJ) and acceptance (AC) are sometimes separated, depending on the measure used,
and thus may have a differential impact on outcomes. In our model, mindfulness reflects the
multiple factors of NJ and AC, in addition to a combined bi-factor representing non-judgmental
acceptance (NJAC). We were thus able to explore the nuances of how these separate dimensions
of mindful AC and NJ may differentially impact interpretation bias and depression. NJ can be
conceptualized as different from AC, in that AC refers to one’s ability to be present with all
aspects of immediate experience, especially negative thoughts and feelings, without trying to
change or suppress them. NJ, on the other hand, refers to refraining from self-focused ruminative
judgment in response to thoughts and emotions that arise from experience, which is important for
staying present to experience as it arises, and may inform one’s acceptance of that experience
(and desire to change it), but does not necessitate desire for such change. The combined nonjudgmental acceptance bi-factor can then be understood to reflect an attitude of openness to
experience that stems from refraining from self-judgment of thoughts and emotions that arise in
response to experience as well as accepting whatever thoughts and feeling arise, without trying
to alter them.
In the current study, higher levels of NJ were significantly associated with more positive
interpretation biases and were approaching significance in relation to lower negative
interpretation bias. AC was negatively associated with negative interpretation bias and was
approaching significance in relation to positively predicting positive interpretation bias. The
more significant relationship between high levels of NJ and more positive interpretation bias
emphasize the positive self-compassionate nature of NJ and suggests that NJ allows one to
consider positive interpretations of the thoughts and feelings one experiences. That higher levels
of AC are more significantly associated with less negative interpretation biases suggests that the
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acceptance of whatever thoughts and feelings that emerge without trying to change them may
help one more easily disengage from negative stimuli. Depression was not associated with NJ in
any of the four models but was significantly negatively associated with AC in all of them. This
supports the idea that the ability to disengage from negative stimuli, as reflected in the negative
relationship between AC and negative interpretation biases, plays a more important role in
preventing depression than the ability to acquire positive interpretations. However, the combined
NJAC factor in the current study positively predicted positive interpretation bias, and negatively
predicted negative interpretation bias and depression. This highlights the combined importance
of both the AC and NJ dimensions in relation to depression. The processes of accepting
experience as it arises while withholding judgment of that experience are likely overlapping and
collectively promote disengagement from negative stimuli in order to allow for more positively
biased interpretations, and less depression. Previous findings suggest that mindfulness negatively
relates to psychological distress through promoting non-attachment to negatively self-oriented
information (Coffey et al., 2010). Further, prior research has reflected that depressed participants
have difficulty disengaging from negative stimuli and lack a positive bias that is present in nondepressed participants. NJAC indeed demonstrated a greater impact in our findings than either
NJ or AC alone.
4.3.6 The importance of positive information processing
While the focus of the literature review for this study was primarily negative processing
biases, given their salience in the clinical literature, positive processing biases were also
considered in light of evidence suggesting that biases towards positive information are found in
non-depressed people. The points made above about negative biases don’t just signify that
present-moment attention may only be helpful in tandem with mindful non-judgmental
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acceptance, but they also highlight the value of present-moment attention in extending awareness
to positive information. It may be that present-moment attention broadens the range of stimuli
likely to be attended to (Everaert, 2012). As a result, one gains heightened awareness of positive
information that contradicts negative self-oriented schemas and inhibits the cascading activation
of negative associative networks that lead to negatively biased interpretations. More positively
biased interpretations may in turn relate to fewer symptoms of depression. Mindfulness has been
found not only to inversely relate to negative cognitions, but also to be positively associated with
expanded awareness of positive information (De Raedt et al., 2012). Findings from the current
study further support this by demonstrating a near significant correlation between presentmoment attention and positive, but not negative, interpretation bias, and a significant negative
relationship between positive interpretation bias and depressive symptoms. The present findings
also showed that non-judgment was associated with positive, but not negative interpretation bias.
In this way, the current study adds support to the importance of positive information processing
in the relationship between mindfulness and depression. The current study builds on the work of
work of both Mayer et al. (2018) and Sanchez and colleagues (2017) to emphasize the important
role positive interpretation biases may play in the mindfulness-depression link.
4.4 Conclusion
The abundance of theory and empirical support discussed above can be boiled down into
several key take-aways: (1) The construct of mindfulness best reflected the factors of presentmoment attention, acceptance, non-judgment, as well as a non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC)
bi-factor, without an overarching latent mindfulness factor; (2) the attention factor did not relate
to depression or interpretation biases, while some evidence suggested an unexpected relationship
between mindful attention and attention bias that should be further explored; (3) the NJAC factor
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appeared to capitalize on the combination of the non-judgment and acceptance factors, in that it
significantly predicted depression and positive and negative interpretation biases in the expected
directions; (4) interpretation bias significantly predicted depression but attention bias did not; (5)
attention bias was not related to interpretation bias or mindful non-judgmental acceptance, and
(6) both negative and positive interpretation biases appeared important in the relationship
between mindfulness and depression via NJAC.
These findings add support to mindfulness as a tool for depression prevention and
intervention and offer additional insight into the mechanism underlying its effect. Specifically,
interpretation bias appears to be an important means through which mindfulness is associated
with depression, and the non-judgmental acceptance dimension of mindfulness appears to be the
most impactful. This pattern of associations may be especially important to during the
transitional period of EA. More work is needed to elucidate how cognitive biases do and can
change over the course of development, but there is research to suggest that the developmental
trajectory of some biases are sensitive to change (Scherf & Scott, 2012). Information processing
biases in the context of relationships, for example, change across EA and have been associated
with meaningful mental health outcomes (Finn et al, 2014). In addition, face processing biases
have been demonstrated to shift during periods of transition and instability (Sherf & Scott). Such
in-between-ness characterizes EA and suggests that the presumed plasticity of information
processing during this period may make it an important time for intervention aimed at reducing
negative processing biases and increasing positive ones. Lastly, the strengthening of self-concept
that occurs during this important period of transition suggests that changes made in biased
information processing during EA have the potential to impact depression across adulthood.
Together then, mindfulness, and especially non-judgmental acceptance, may be an especially
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salient tool for intervention during the sensitive period of EA that could greatly impact negative
and positive information processing biases, and, in turn, the course of depression across the
adulthood, reducing the public health impact of this mental illness.
4.5 Limitations and future directions
There are several limitations that should be kept in mind when considering the present
findings and conducting future research. Primarily, the analyses were conducted on a crosssectional sample. Thus, any claims about causality are not supported. While important
information can be gleaned about the pieces of the mindfulness-combined cognitive biasdepression relationship, future research will ideally explore longitudinal relationships among
these variables.
Additionally, the sample was relatively homogenous in terms of race/ethnicity. The data
were also collected from a community sample, and thus did not reflect clinical levels of
depression. While the variability in depressive symptoms was of particular interest in this study,
results may differ with a clinically depressed sample. The current study did not control for
demographic variables, in line with suggestions by Jaccard et al. (2006) and Spector and
Brannick (2010), who advise against doing so in some circumstances due to a reduction in power
for the sake of a small potential increase in the precision of an already evident effect, and at the
risk of distorting the estimates. Future research should, however, explore measurement
invariance based on demographic distinctions such as gender, age, race, socioeconomic status,
and primary language, as important differences may become apparent that would improve our
understanding about how mindfulness, cognitive biases, and depression may function differently
across diverse sectors.
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In addition to potential limitations associated with the sample, methodological limitations
are also likely. Specifically, the study did not find an association between attention bias and
depression, which may call into question pre-existing concerns about the reliability of the dot
probe task. Our lack of mood induction prior to the task and the stimulus presentation of only
500 ms may also be limitations. Researchers are developing alternative ways to calculate dotprobe data, such as work by Zvielli et al., 2015 that produces multiple indices of attention bias by
calculating trial level bias scores according to the time series of congruent-incongruent trials.
However, when data from this method were used in additional models not presented here, the
results remained largely the same, which may provide further support for our findings.
Researchers should continue to pursue alternative methods of calculating attention bias from the
dot probe task and alternative paradigms with which to measure attention bias.
It is important to note the non-judgmental acceptance (NJAC) bi-factor indicated in the
best fitting measurement may indeed represent an additional non-judgmental acceptance factor
distinct from either of the independent non-judgment or acceptance factors, but it is also possible
that this bi-factor simply represents items that were negatively worded on the scale. In other
words, it is possible that this bi-factor could be a methodological artifact reflecting nothing more
than all items that were worded negatively. However, it has been suggested that if the factor does
not merely reflect the shared wording of items, that it will predict outcomes differentially (Marsh
et al., 2010). As seen in the results from our SEM models, this was indeed the case. Theory and
prior research indicating a similar factor structure to the current model also lend support to the
validity of the NJAC bi-factor as reflecting the inter-relationship of acceptance and nonjudgment above and beyond the factors of attention and acceptance and non-judgment
separately. In order to better account for this issue in the future, however, researchers modeling

61
mindfulness with data collected from the CEDMI should consider including an orthogonal
method factor to account for construct-irrelevant variance from negatively worded items.
It was unfortunate that we were unable to examine the role of memory bias in the models.
In light of evidence testing the combined cognitive bias hypothesis, memory bias may help
further explain relationships in the models. Perhaps with the inclusion of memory bias, a
significant pathway from attention bias to the other variables in the model would become
apparent. In addition to considering the trifecta of attention, interpretation, and memory biases in
future studies examining cognitive biases as mediators in the mindfulness-depression link,
alternative models whereby mindfulness mediates the relationship between cognitive biases and
depression should also be explored. It was also unfortunate that we were unable to examine the
impact of meditation experience in our models, as prior research has suggested such experience
is relevant and may indeed provide further insight into the mechanisms at hand.
Despite several limitations, the current study is enhanced through the use of an
empirically-derived mindfulness scale, which is important in light of the many different scales
that claim to measure mindfulness. Additionally, measures of interpretation bias, as well as
attention bias, were resistant to reporting biases common with self-report measures. Further,
powerful, cutting-edge statistical techniques were used to empirically determine the most valid
factor structure of mindfulness, and to subsequently test the relationships between the factors of
mindfulness, attention and interpretation biases, and depression.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A: Self-Report Measures
Demographics
1) What is your sex ___1 Male

____ 0 Female

2) How many years of education have you completed
___1 Completed High School (or GED)
___2 Completed First Year of College
___3 Completed Second Year of College
___4 Completed Third Year of College
___5 Completed Fourth Year of College
___6 Earned Bachelor’s Degree
___7 Completed Graduate work (how many years? ___)
3) Are you currently in a romantic relationship?
__ ____ No, I am currently single
__ ____Yes, I am dating at least one person casually
__ ____Yes, I am in an exclusive relationship
__ ____Yes, I am engaged to be married
__ ____Yes, I am married or in a life-long, committed partnership
4) Are you of Hispanic/Latino origin?
___1 Yes
___0 No
5) Which race or ethnicity do you consider yourself to be?
___1 White/Caucasian
___2 Black/ African-American
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___3 East Asian (i.e. Chinese, Japanese, Vietnamese)
___4 South Asian (i.e. Indian, Pakistani, Burmese)
___5 American Indian or Alaskan Native
___6 Pacific Islander or Native Hawaiian
___7 Other (please specify _____________)
6) Is English your primary language?
___1 Yes
___0No (please specify ________________________________)
7) Where were you born?
___1 United States
___0 Not United States
8) Where did you (primarily) grow up?
___1 United States
___0 Not United States
9) How would you describe the economic situation of your household when you were in
high school? [Check one]
___We had barely enough to get by
___We had enough to get by but not more
___We were solidly middle class
___We had plenty of "extras"
___We had plenty of "luxuries."
10) What is your age? ____
11) Have you ever been diagnosed with the following psychiatric disorders?
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Major Depression

___Yes

___No

Bipolar Depression

___Yes

___No

Generalized Anxiety Disorder

___Yes

___No

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

___Yes

___No

Social Phobia

___Yes

___No

Specific Phobia (e.g., fear of heights, crowds, dogs, etc.) ___Yes

___No

Eating Disorder

___Yes

___No

Schizophrenia

___Yes

___No

Alcohol / Substance Abuse or Dependence

___Yes

___No

12) Have you ever received psychiatric treatment for any of the following psychiatric
disorders?
Major Depression

___Yes

___No

Bipolar Depression

___Yes

___No

Generalized Anxiety Disorder

___Yes

___No

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

___Yes

___No

Social Phobia

___Yes

___No

Specific Phobia (e.g., fear of heights, crowds, dogs, etc.) ___Yes

___No

Eating Disorder

___Yes

___No

Schizophrenia

___Yes

___No

Alcohol / Substance Abuse or Dependence

___Yes

___No

13) Are you currently receiving treatment for any psychiatric disorders? ___Yes ___No
If so, what are you currently receiving treatment for?_______________________
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14) Please specify which (if any) family member(s) has experienced each psychiatric
disorder. Please circle all that apply. For instance, if both your mother and grandmother
experience Major Depression, you would circle both “Mother” and “Grandparent.”
Major Depression
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Bipolar Depression
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Generalized Anxiety Disorder
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Social Phobia
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Specific Phobia (e.g., fear of heights, crowds, dogs, etc.)
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Aunt/Uncle

None

Eating Disorder
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent

Alcohol / Substance Abuse or Dependence
Mother

Father

Sibling

Grandparent
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BDI-II

Instructions: This questionnaire consists of 20 groups of statements. Please read each group of
statements carefully, and then pick out the one statement in each group that best describes the
way you have been feeling during the past two weeks, including today. Circle the number
beside the statement you have picked. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally
well, circle the highest number for that group. Be sure that you do not choose more than one
statement for any group, including Item 15 (Changes in Sleeping Pattern) or Item 17 (Changes
in Appetite).

1. Sadness
0

I do not feel sad.

1

I feel sad much of the time.

2

I am sad all the time.

3

I am so sad or unhappy that I can’t stand it.

2. Pessimism
0

I am not discouraged about my future.

1

I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be.

2

I do not expect things to work out for me.

3

I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse.
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3. Past Failure
0

I do not feel like a failure.

1

I have failed more than I should have.

2

As I look back, I see a lot of failures.

3

I feel I am a total failure as a person.

4. Loss of Pleasure
0

I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy.

1

I don’t enjoy things as much as I used to.

2

I get very little pleasure from the things I used enjoy.

3

I can’t get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.

5. Guilty Feelings
0

I don’t feel particularly guilty.

1

I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done.

2

I feel quite guilty most of the time.

3

I feel guilty all the time.

6. Punishment Feelings
0 I don’t feel I am being punished.
1

I feel I may be punished.

2

I expect to be punished.

3

I feel I am being punished.
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7. Self-Dislike
0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
1 I have lost confidence in myself.
2 I am disappointed in myself.
3 I dislike myself.

8. Self-Criticalness
0 I don’t criticize or blame myself more than usual.
1 I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

9. Crying
0 I don’t cry any more than I used to.
1 I cry more than I used to.
2 I cry over every little thing.
3 I feel like crying, but I can’t.

10. Agitation
0 I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
2 I am so restless or agitated that it’s hard to stay still.
3 I am so restless or agitated that I have to keep moving or doing something.
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11. Loss of Interest
0 I have not lost interest in other people or activities.
1 I am less interested in other people or things than before.
2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things.
3 It’s hard to get interested in anything.

12. Indecisiveness
1

I make decisions about as well as ever.

2 I find it more difficult to make decisions than usual.
3 I have much greater difficulty in making decisions than I used to.
4 I have trouble making any decisions.

13. Worthiness
0 I do not feel like I am worthless.
1 I don’t consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to.
2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people.
3 I feel utterly worthless.

14. Loss of Energy
0 I have as much energy as ever.
1 I have less energy than I used to have.
2 I don’t have enough energy to do very much.
3 I don’t have enough energy to do anything.
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15. Changes in Sleeping Pattern
0 I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern.
1a I sleep somewhat more than usual.
1b I sleep somewhat less than usual.
2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
3a I sleep most of the day.
3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can’t get back to sleep

16. Irritability
0 I am no more irritable than usual.
1 I am more irritable than usual.
2 I am much more irritable than usual.
3 I am irritable all the time.

17. Changes in Appetite
0 I have not experienced any change in appetite
1a My appetite is somewhat less than usual.
1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
2a My appetite is much less than before.
2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
3a I have no appetite at all.
3b I crave food all the time.
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18. Concentration Difficulty
0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
1 I can’t concentrate as well as usual.
2 It’s hard to keep my mind on anything for very long.
3 I find I can’t concentrate on anything.

19. Tiredness or Fatigue
0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual.
2 I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of things I used to do.
3 I am too tired or fatigued to do most of the things I used to do.

20. Loss of Interest in Sex
0 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
1 I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
2 I am much less interested in sex now.
3 I have lost interest in sex completely.
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CEDMI
Please indicate below how often the following items are true for you:

When I’m walking, I

Never or

Rarely

Sometimes

Often

Very

very

true

true

true

often or

rarely

always

true

true

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

deliberately notice the sensations
of my body moving.
I criticize myself for having
irrational or inappropriate
emotions.
When I take a shower or bath, I
stay alert to the sensations of
water on my body.
I tell myself I shouldn’t be
feeling the way I’m feeling.
I notice how foods and drinks
affect my thoughts, bodily
sensations, and emotions.
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I believe some of my thoughts

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

are abnormal or bad and I
shouldn’t think that way.
I pay attention to sensations,
such as the wind in my hair or
sun on my face.
I make judgments about whether
my thoughts are good or bad.
I pay attention to sounds, such as
clocks ticking, birds chirping, or
cars passing.
I tell myself that I shouldn’t be
thinking the way I’m thinking.
I notice the smells and aromas of
things.
I think some of my emotions are
bad or inappropriate and I
shouldn’t feel them.
I notice visual elements in art or
nature, such as colors, shapes,
textures, or patterns of light and
shadow.
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I notice visual elements in art or

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

nature, such as colors, shapes,
textures, or patterns of light and
shadow.
When I have distressing
thoughts or images, I judge
myself as good or bad,
depending what the
thought/image is about.
I pay attention to how my
emotions affect my thoughts and
behavior.
I disapprove of myself when I
have irrational ideas.
When I’m upset, I become angry
with myself for feeling that way.
When I’m upset, I become
embarrassed for feeling that
way.
When I’m upset, I feel ashamed
for feeling that way.
When I’m upset, I feel like I am
weak.
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When I’m upset, I feel guilty for

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

feeling that way.
When I’m upset, I become
irritated with myself for feeling
that way.
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Scrambled Sentence Task
Condition:

CL

NoCL

For this section you will be asked to unscramble sentences to form statements. Each of the
scrambled sentences contains six words. Unscramble five words in each sentence by placing a
number over each of five words indicating the proper order. For example:

3

2

1

5

4

has green child the eyes blue

Unscramble the sentences to form statements, not questions. Each sentence can be unscrambled
into more than one statement, but you should choose only one statement to unscramble. You can
unscramble the sentences to form whatever statement comes to mind first. Work as quickly as
you can because your time will be limited. Do not correct errors. If you make a mistake simply
move on to the next item.
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1.

looks the future bright very dismal

2.

interesting life my boring generally is

3.

usually like people not me do

4.

equal am others I inferior to

5.

living life not worth is well

6.

worthwhile I worthless am a person

7.

failure I a am generally success

8.

love I others' don't deserve generally

9.

about do care people me don't

10.

have I my friends lost helped

11.

is impossible to happiness possible attain

12.

is appearance physical my unchanged worsening
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13.

well me people of poorly think

14.

not college is worth well it

15.

me people understand do not usually

16.

am I ruining life improving my

17.

person an am inadequate I adequate

18.

others' cannot I can meet expectations

19.

I little offer to have much

20.

my wasted I utilized have opportunities

21.

have life succeeded failed I at

22.

happy miserable be I expect to

23.

curious I person bad a am
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24.

will goals I cannot achieve my

25.

me to is life cruel good

Please STOP HERE.
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ALERT RESEARCHER THAT YOU HAVE COMPLETED THE SENTENCES.
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Condition:

CL

NoCL

For this section you will be asked to unscramble sentences to form statements. Each of the
scrambled sentences contains six words. Unscramble five words in each sentence by placing a
number over each of five words indicating the proper order. For example:

3

2

1

5

4

has green child the eyes blue

Unscramble the sentences to form statements, not questions. Each sentence can be unscrambled
into more than one statement, but you should choose only one statement to unscramble. You can
unscramble the sentences to form whatever statement comes to mind first. Work as quickly as
you can because your time will be limited. Do not correct errors. If you make a mistake simply
move on to the next item.
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26.

disappointed have I friends pleased my

27.

trying keep to stop want I

28.

good feel very bad I usually

29.

myself in disappointed am confident I

30.

life makes good nothing me feel

31.

time I alone enjoy my dislike

32.

I fail will once succeed more

33.

something I give nothing to have

34.

forever want sleep I live to

35.

usually feel I energetic tired very

36.

who I dislike I am like

37.

good mostly memories my sad are
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38.

is nothing me something with wrong

39.

is stressful life interesting my very

40.

personal satisfying my disappointing relationships are

41.

things can't I get can together

42.

born I loser a winner am

43.

decisions problems making I confidence have

44.

quite generally incapable I capable am

45.

happen bad seem good to things

46.

person good a am defective I

47.

my boring is interesting life usually

48.

concentration worse now my is better
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49.

often crying like I laughing feel

50.

seldom death often of think I
#________________________________

